It appears most clear that test measure correspondence and that its liability is at best dependent on or, as we might say relative to, the actual coherence with the tendencies measured with the objective reality. And, onto those relative terms we infer an absolute state... it is the first obvious incoherence we may note of it: its liability depends on the right evaluation of the groundwork which commands it.
But by far the most irrelevant consideration it sees to put to silence has been alluded here more than once: it sees at the measurement of conceptual analysis and representation. We do not see in it any kind of measure to means of synthesis such as those we might call emotions, creativity and even perceptibility and its related motor coherence that is movement; although psychology, anthropology and biology all recognize the existence of intelligence to birds and animals by its capacity of learning - and Skinner showed it brilliantly with its numerous experiences on operand conditioning - and even of being creative. I call many of those unmeasured acts means of synthesis for the simple reason that it sees at the correlation of two or many objective instances and produces a form of development. As surprising as it may seen, I observed a bird combining two learnings to solve a problem; if it didn't posit the reality in those terms, it did used two apparently incoherent skills to gain something... that is creativity and in a bird.
If we cannot imagine to postulate about the correspondence of birds, which as I showed can be incredibly surprising, how will we posit answers about a human being?
Motor skills are not evaluated; emotions are not evaluated; creativity is not evaluated... yet, I can demonstrate their existence within even a red fish or a bird by very simple responding and operand conditionings. The problem is thence graspable and obvious to our eyes: there are different abilities related to intelligence and the mistake is to order them; the difference is qualitative and nominative and these aren't comparable de facto.
Supporting it is inexorably fallacious and a proof of tendency, of a favourable propensity, toward the preservation of beliefs and of convictions... Socrates had a great name for it: pretentiousness, arrogance.